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GUN RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
VIOLENT CRIME
Jonathan Simon'
INTRODUCTION: THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
In their thoughtful and well-researched book on the right to arms as granted by
the U.S. Constitution, Richard Uviller and William Merkel make a persuasive
argument that the Second Amendment as originally ratified did not include an
individual's right to bear arms outside of participation in the state militias.' For the
Framers of the Amendment and the generation of Americans who ratified the
Constitution, the popular possession of firearms had constitutional significance, but
only insofar as it served to sustain the unique institution of state militias as a vital
part of the defense of the new nation. The question remains, however, as to how
much that late eighteenth-century understanding should bind Americans, or their
courts and legislatures, in the early twenty-first century.
The groundbreaking work of Bruce Ackerman has pointed to a way of thinking
about our constitutional obligations that is both more complicated and more
historically adequate than the standard model of interpreting the original document
and its formal textual amendments.2 In Ackerman's account, Article V of the
Constitution is not an exclusive procedure for amending the Constitution but rather
a schema for recognizing moments of "higher lawmaking" that amend or even
transform the Constitution. To be sure, the procedure described in Article V
remains one option, and has been used many times since 1789, but on other
occasions the constitutional system has been transformed by periods of "higher
lawmaking" that cannot easily be fitted to the letter of Article V.3
Ackerman points to two such moments in particular. After the Civil War, the
Republican majority in Congress constitutionalized the emancipation of the slaves
by proposing the Thirteenth Amendment. President Andrew Johnson negotiated
with Southern leaders to secure the ratification of that Amendment in exchange for
* Professor of law, jurisprudence, and social policy, University of California, Berkeley.
See RICHARDUVaiR &WILIAM MERKEL, THEMIiIA AND THERIGHTTO ARMS,OR,
How THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002).
2 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
FOUNDATIONs]; BRUCE ACKERmAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)
[hereinafter TRANSFORMATIONS].
3 TRANSFORMATIONS,Supra note 2, at 268-69 (stating that "the higher lawmaking efforts
of the 1930's broke with the premises of Article Five...").
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returning the rebellious states to full status in Congress.' This deal soon fell apart
as an increasingly radicalized Republican majority in Congress sought to
fundamentally recast the role of federal power. The resulting Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be easily assimilated to the textual amendment procedure of
Article V.' Instead, Ackerman argues, Congress began a process of higher
lawmaking outside the textual channels of Article V against the resistance of
President Johnson and the partially reconstructed Southern state governments.
After winning decisive elections in 1866 and 1868, the Republican Congress
succeeded in consolidating support behind the Fourteenth Amendment,
demonstrating the broad consensus of an aroused public on notice as to the
constitutional significance of what was being done, and thus acting self-consciously
as "We the People." Because of this protracted battle, the resulting change in our
understanding of our constitutional republic remains worthy of preservation by
subsequent generations long after that aroused self-understanding has gone.
Ackerman argues that the battle between President Franklin Roosevelt and the
conservative majority on the Supreme Court in the early 1930s over the
constitutionality of New Deal legislation designed to rescue the nation from the
Great Depression constituted a second such period of higher lawmaking
Frustrated by the rejection of his economic recovery legislation by the Court,
Roosevelt announced his (in)famous "Court-packing" plan. While Congress never
adopted the plan, the conservative majority on the Court bent to the pressure in what
came to be known as the "switch in time that saved nine." Discouraged
conservatives soon stepped down from the Supreme Court to be replaced by new
Justices anxious to implement the New Deal program. Roosevelt's stunning
electoral victories in 1936 and 1940 confirmed and consolidated this judicial
transformation, effectively ratifying a new constitutional scheme of federal powers
in the area of economic regulation.10
In Ackerman's account, each of these changes (and the original Federal
Constitution itself) not only produced more than specific amendments, but initiated
fundamental recasting of the existing federal system." Thus judges obliged to
4 Id. at 140 (describing the North Carolina Proclamation as an example of how this was
achieved).
' FOUNDATIONS,supra note 2, at44-45 (stating that "[t]he Reconstruction Amendments
especially the Fourteenth - would never have been ratified if the Republicans had
followed the rules laid down by Article Five...").
6 Id. at 81 (stating that "the will of the nation was independent of, and superior to, the
will of the states" (footnote omitted)).
7 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 47.
s Id. at49.
9 Id.
'0 Id. at 48.
11 Id. at44.
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preserve the constitutional choices of"We the People" need to examine not just the
original understanding of particular clauses of the Constitution, but how these may
have been recast by succeeding constitutional moments. Nor is the door closed to
further such changes. Ackerman argues that the study of both constitutional
moments points to a consistent structure underlying such moments that can be used
to assess the claims of social movements that would like to recast our constitutional
order. He identifies five steps as integral to any successful constitutional moment: 2
1. A "signaling" phase when a major constitutional impasse
highlights to the American people that core values of our system
are at stake.
2. A "propositional" phase when the proponents of change
articulate their vision and win a sufficient political victory to
demonstrate real capacity to mobilize the public.
3. A "triggering" phase, when strong opposition by
"conservatives" initiates a full fledged political battle among
different institutions of government over the direction of the
country.
4. A "ratifying" phase, when the battle, having been joined, the
American people mark their support for or rejection of
constitutional change.
5. A"consolidating" phase, when having had a chance to fully take
notice that the nature of the constitutional system is really
changing, the American people mark their acceptance of that
change.
In his most recent volume, Ackerman explores a more recent period of
constitutional contention, when the Reagan Administration articulated a powerful
critique of the "welfare state" forged by the New Deal." Reagan never succeeded
in ratifying any of the numerous formal constitutional amendments proposed by his
administration and supporters," but he did succeed in delegitimizing many of the
collectivist rationalities of governance underlying the New Deal, and enacting a
major tax cut that strained the revenue sources of the welfare state. " Reagan also
followed Roosevelt's lead in seeking to appoint visionary Supreme Court Justices
ready to reassess the victories of the New Deal and the subsequent jurisprudence
of the Warren Court. " Indeed, in Ackerman's account, it was the failure of Reagan
12 TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 2, at 39-40.
13 Id. at 390 (describing "presidential" signaling).
'4 Id. at 390-92.
I' Id. at 391.
" Id. at 391-92.
2004] 337
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
and his successors to pursue this battle in the court of public opinion that undercuts
any claim that Reagan's popularity constitutes a true change in the U.S.
Constitution. 7 The most articulate constitutional theorist of the Reagan moment,
conservative legal scholar and judge Robert Bork failed to win Senate approval
after one of the most contentious debates in modem history." The failure of
Reagan and his successor, George H. W. Bush, to nominate scholars or judges with
comparably public postures as change agents, suggests that they were unwilling to
proceed to the kind of politically risky battle whose victory can warrant the
recognition of constitutional change. 9 Reagan and Bush nominated other
conservatives who were approved, but like Justice Anthony Kennedy, they were
more moderate in their judicial philosophy, or like Justice Clarence Thomas, they
publicly denied their radical philosophy. °
In considering Uviller and Merkel's analysis of the Second Amendment, we
need to look beyond the founding period to subsequent constitutional moments that
have recast the meaning of that Amendment. A case can be made that the
Fourteenth Amendment and the contemporary constitutional moment that led to its
ratification worked a fundamental change in the meaning of the Second
Amendment.2 The meaning ofthe militias, which, as Uviller and Merkel show, had
long been in decline, was permanently altered by battles between Union and
Confederate armies.22 Perhaps most importantly, Reconstruction intensified the
national commitment to individual, as opposed to states', rights.23 It is not
implausible to think that the Reconstruction Republicans, confronted by organized
violence against recently freed slaves in the South, saw the right to arms belonging
to individuals as a crucial support to their liberty. 4
The New Deal constitutional moment is a far less likely source of support for
an individual right to arms. That moment, after all, embraced collectivist solutions
to social problems that seriously compromised the individual rights vision of our
17 TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 2, at 394-95.
I d. at 27.
I9 d. at 398-99.
20 Id. at 396-97.
2 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional
Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 889, 900 ("Thus the Reconstruction Amendment, when
read in the light of its history, does support an individual right to have a gun in one's home
for self- protection."); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 46-63, 257-68 (1998); Brent J. McIntosh, The Revolutionary Second
Amendment, 51 ALA. L. REv. 673, 674-79 (2000).
22 UVILLER & MERKEL, Supra note 1, at 119, 131.
23 See ERiCFONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERCA'SUNFINISHEDREVOLkrION, 1863-1877,
at 258 (1988).
24 Uviller and Merkel address these arguments in their book, UVILLER & MERKEL, supra
note 1, at 202-09, but since our interests lie in the more recent period, I will not consider this
debate here.
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Constitution. The great lesson of the Depression was that social problems could not
be solved simply by calling for greater individual resoluteness or discipline, but
required a strong federal government to create systems of collective risk sharing.
There is little basis to believe that the lessons of the Great Depression or the
capacity of strong central government to protect Americans from economic disaster
should be read as enhancing the right of individuals to bear arms outside of
participation in collective institutions.
The remainder of this essay suggests that we may have, in fact, experienced a
new constitutional moment since the 1960s, with profound implications for gun
rights. This constitutional moment has taken shape around the problem of criminal
violence and the widespread and enduring fear among Americans that our systems
of public security, primarily our criminal justice system, could not protect them
from becoming victims. In what follows, I will use Ackerman's framework to make
a case that we have had a constitutional moment around criminal violence and
victimization and that this moment of higher lawmaking could well be interpreted
byjudges as sustaining an individual right to arms. Like the previous constitutional
moments, around Reconstruction and the New Deal, constitutional change around
criminal violence has involved a prolonged struggle between branches of the federal
government and involved the states. Like these previous moments, the
consolidation of a new constitutional consensus around criminal violence at first
seems rather narrow in its substantive focus. However, the passage of decades has
shown those earlier moments to be far broader in their governmental impact and the
same may be true of crime.
I. THE SIGNALING PHASE: FROM MAPP AND MIRANDA TO THE 1968 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION
As with the earlier constitutional moments, the constitutional transformation
around crime has its roots in powerful social problems. The closest analogy is to
the New Deal, when the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression brought
pressure on political institutions that soon broke through the channels of normal
politics. Starting in the early 1960s, violent crime in the United States (and actually
across much of the globe) began a rapid rise that peaked in the 1970s and remained
high, with additional peaks appearing through the early 1990s, until a sustained
decline began. Nothing epitomized the new threat of violence more than murder,
the reported incidents of which more than doubled during the 1960s.25
American political institutions began to respond to this emerging threat in a
variety of ways. The Kennedy Administration (1961-1963) initiated a number of
high-profile programs narrowly aimed at youth crime and improving the
2S See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 451
(1993).
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rehabilitative capacity of the correctional systems in the states.26 However, the
assassination of President Kennedy during his motorcade through Dallas, Texas on
November 22, 1963, blamed on an individual bearing a mail-order rifle, seemed
only to confirm that criminal violence, especially in America's large cities,
threatened all Americans.
In the 1964 election, Republican candidate Barry Goldwater spoke of "crime
in the streets" during his nomination acceptance speech.27 The Democratic
nominee, Lyndon Johnson, succeeded instead in focusing the election on
Goldwater's alleged extremism in foreign affairs. 8 Johnson won by a landslide,
and his administration took on the crime issue by declaring "war on crime" and
initiating a presidential commission to recommend a comprehensive strategy to
improve the nation's law enforcement capacity.29
Despite this attention, violent crime rates continued to grow during the second
half of the 1960s.3" The perception of a breakdown in crime control was further
heightened by the political violence that grew during the second half of the 1960s,
including riots in the impoverished minority neighborhoods of large cities like Los
Angeles, Detroit, and Newark, protests against the increasingly unpopular war in
Vietnam, and an ominous pattern of assassinations of political leaders.3 This
culminated in the 1968 slayings of civil-rights leader Martin Luther King and liberal
Democratic presidential candidate, Senator Robert Kennedy.
Social problems, even extreme ones, do not, by themselves, lead to
constitutional moments. Instead, it is the way political institutions respond to social
crises that can create moments of higher lawmaking. It is possible that America's
response to the dramatic rise of violent crime during the 1960s might have stayed
within the channels of normal politics. A crucial, if unintended, push toward
constitutional change came from the Supreme Court. In a series of landmark
constitutional decisions beginning in 1961, the Court enhanced procedural
protections for defendants in criminal cases. In Mapp v. Ohio,32 the Court reversed
a precedent less than fifteen years old and held that state courts were obliged to
follow the so-called "exclusionary rule" by excluding evidence collected in
violation of the Fourth Amendment from the prosecution's case-in-chief.33 In
26 NANCY E. MARION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE PoL1TIcs BEHIND THE SYSTEM
33 (2002).
27 E. J. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS HATE PoLrTcs 179 (1990).
28 See id.
29 FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 274.
'o See id. at 451.
31 See id.
32 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
33 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was
binding on the states through incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, but further holding that the exclusionary rule was not incorporated as a mandatory
remedy to violations of the Fourth Amendment).
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Gideon v. Wainwright,34 the Court extended an existing line of precedents by
holding that states must provide counsel to indigent defendants facing felony trials.
Finally, in Miranda v. Arizona," the Court held that state courts must exclude
statements taken by police officers in custodial interrogations unless suspects
received a comprehensive package of warnings about the risks of speaking to the
police, including the right to remain silent, and to have an attorney present during
the interrogation.
As revolutionary as these decisions may have seemed to many Americans
(including American lawyers)," they can each be understood as part of the normal,
if often controversial, work of the Court in interpreting existing constitutional texts
and moments. Indeed all three should be seen as interpretations of the original
Federalist Constitution as modified by the Reconstruction constitutional moment.37
The Federalists intended the Fourth and Sixth Amendments as protections against
abuse of criminal justice power by an overreaching federal government. The
Republican Reconstruction established a new concern with protecting individual
rights against abuse of power by the state governments. The line of cases holding
certain elements of the Bill of Rights applicable to the state governments began in
the late nineteenth century, and accelerated rapidly in the years leading up to the
New Deal constitutional moment.
This doctrine, known as incorporation, became far more potent and sweeping
after the New Deal was well established. As we review the criminal procedure
decisions of the 1960s, we can see them as normal interpretations of the Federalist
and Reconstruction amendments into the new logic of the New Deal. The idea, so
palpable in all three opinions, but especially in Miranda v. Arizona,38 that protecting
individual rights required structural reform of state institutions rather than case-by-
case judicial remedies, was a central legacy of the New Deal moment. Moreover,
it is widely recognized today that the Court in the 1960s saw criminal justice cases
as integral to protecting the civil-rights movement that was working to realize
promises of the Reconstruction period left unfulfilled due to political compromises
3 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
31 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
3 Indeed, after the 1960s it became common to refer to these landmark decisions and the
numerous lesser decisions decided in the same period as a revolution in criminal procedure.
3' Ackerman suggests that the work of constitutional interpretation consists in large part
of examining how the meaning of constitutional texts enacted at one stage have been altered
in their meaning by subsequent constitutional moments. For example, he argues that Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 383 (1954), correctly reinterpreted the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in light of the new role of an activist federal state after
the New Deal. It is central to Ackerman's theory that, when judges engage in this kind of
interpretation of one constitutional moment or another, they are "preserving" the meaning of
past constitutional transformations, even if, as in the case of Brown, the result is
controversial. See also FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 144-45.
11 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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by the Republicans in the 1870s and by the New Deal Democrats in the 1930s
(when Roosevelt refused even to sign anti-lynching legislation for fear of offending
southern white Democrats). 9
This process of normal constitutional interpretation by the Warren Court
seemed threatening to the growing rates and perceptions of violent crime. While
the Supreme Court was not signaling the need for a new constitutional struggle, the
response of political leaders, especially candidates for the presidency, began to take
on this character.' While Democrat Lyndon Johnson was striving to place the
crime problem within his "Great Society" vision for expanding the New Deal, a
number of opposition candidates arose who specifically focused on crime.4' While
social movements of the Left were gaining considerable attention for their stands
on civil rights (now transformed into Black Power) and in opposition to the war in
Vietnam, the two major candidates facing Hubert Humphrey42 (the Democratic
nominee in 1968) focused their major attacks on the crime problem.43 Nixon's
victory, close as it was, and his considerable success in traditionally Democratic
strongholds, could be seen (even at the time) as a result of the crime problem.44
I. THE PROPOSING AND TRIGGERING PHASE: FROM THE OMNIBUS CRIME
CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968 TO FURMAN v. GEORGIA
Proposing constitutional change is often associated with a major electoral battle.
The congressional election of 1866 provided a stage on which the ambitions of the
Republicans in Congress became the central controversy.45 By campaigning
vigorously against the direction Reconstruction was taking, and then losing,
President Andrew Johnson helped trigger a constitutional crisis that would soon
include his own impeachment. In the presidential election of 1936, Franklin
Roosevelt's frustrations with the conservative Supreme Court and his "Court-
packing" plan became central concerns, placing the agenda of constitutional change
squarely before the American electorate.'
" Louis Michael Seidman, Brown andMiranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673,678 (1992) ("Both
supporters and opponents of Miranda understood that, in large measure, the crime problem
was the race problem.").
40 FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 274.
4' KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW & ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN PoLmcs 38 (1997).
42 Humphrey was President Lyndon Johnson's vice president
43 KATHERINE BECKErT, supra note 41, at 38.
44 RICHARD ScAMMONS&BENJAMIN WATrENBERG, THEREALMAIORrrY 206-10(1969)
(This highly influential book argued that Republican domination of"social issues," especially
crime, was leading to the breakup of the New Deal coalition that had dominated the country
since the 1930s).
45 TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 2, at 179-81.
41 Id. at 308-10.
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If we have experienced a constitutional moment concerning criminal violence
and what government should do about it, the presidential election campaign of 1968
clearly marked the moment when the growing constitutional tension around crime
moved into an open challenge to existing institutions, triggering a period of higher
lawmaking. The election was one of the closest in American history.47 Lyndon
Johnson, beset by national concerns about the Vietnam War, chose not to seek a
second term.48 After a primary campaign focused on the war, the Democrats chose
Vice President Hubert Humphrey (an outcome partially determined by the
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy)."9 The Republicans nominated former
Vice President Richard Nixon who lost a close election to John Kennedy in 1960.50
For the first time since the 1948 election, these major party candidates were
confronted by a serious third party challenge from Governor George Wallace of
Alabama who had emerged as the strongest defender of white southern racial
policies." Nixon and Wallace both made crime the major focus of their attacks on
the incumbent administration. 2 In repeated attacks on the Supreme Court and
Johnson's Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, both Nixon and Wallace claimed the
country was facing a breakdown of law and order that required a major assertion of
federal power in an area of governance traditionally left to state and local
governments. 3 Only Democrat Hubert Humphrey took the position in the campaign
that crime could be addressed with New Deal-like strategies of fighting poverty and
inequality.
54
Even before the election itself, Congress responded to the growing national
clamor about crime (intensified by the campaign) by enacting the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968." The development of the law highlights the
shift from ordinary to higher lawmaking. In 1967 the Johnson Administration
introduced a crime bill tailored to address the findings of the recently published
report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice. 6 The thrust of the administration's bill was an effort to fund research
41 See JOHN KENTLETON, PRESIDENT AND NATION: THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
229 (2002).
48 See id. at 228.
49 See VAUGHN DAVIS BORNET, THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 310-11
(1983).
SO See KENTLETON, supra note 47, at 222.
5' See id. at 227.
52 See BECKET, supra note 41, at 38.
" See id.
'4 See id.
" Pub. L. No. 90-351 § 701 (a), 82 Stat. 210 (1968), and Pub. L. No. 90-578 § 301 (a)(3),
82 Stat. 1115 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2003)).
56 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT& ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
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and reform efforts aimed at improving the fairness and capacity of local and state
criminal justice agencies. In this sense it was a continuation of the governmental
strategies that were already being promoted in the "war on poverty" to create new
networks of knowledge and power aimed at improving governance rather than
changing individual behavior.
Candidate Nixon took precise aim at this kind of application of the New Deal/
Great Society vision of governance to the crime problem. Nixon argued that the
"solution to the crime problem is not the quadrupling of funds for any governmental
war on poverty but more convictions.""7  Although Democrats held a strong
majority in Congress, a coalition of Republicans and conservative Southern
Democrats modified the Johnson program to give operational control over the new
federal funds to governors and other state officials (in this sense it anticipated the
revenue-sharing approach to federal largesse that the Nixon Administration would
pursue more generally). More importantly, new articles were added to the
legislation, toughening sentences for some federal crimes and denying federal
benefits to rioters.5" Most significantly, in terms of the proposing and triggering
stage of constitutional change, a new article was added purporting to reverse the
Miranda decision by instructing federal courts to admit statements taken in
custodial interrogations so long as they were "voluntary."59 This section appeared
to challenge the constitutional nature of the Miranda decision.'
Nixon's victory in 1968 was too close to be taken as the kind of election that
ratifies constitutional change, but together with the challenge to judicial supremacy
in the Crime Control Act of 1968,6" the new tough on crime politics can be fairly
seen as proposing a new constitutional vision. This vision was that a central
purpose of the federal government was to protect ordinary Americans not from
abuse by state governments, or from general economic collapse, but from acts of
criminal violence by other Americans.
Nixon had few immediate options to expand the federal role in the war on
crime, other than giving money to the states. Federal jurisdiction over crimes was
generally limited to certain kinds of interstate criminal activity like bootlegging.62
Over the years federal jurisdiction had been created in a few specific areas but no
general federal police power existed. Nixon strategically decided to launch an
" BEcKErr, supra note 41, at 38.
58 See id. at 39.
' Pub. L. No. 90-351 § 701(a), 82 Stat. 210 (1968), and Pub. L. No. 90-578 § 301(a)(3),
82 Stat. 1115 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2003)).
'0 The question raisedby this as to whether Miranda was in fact aconstitutional decision,
or merely a rule of evidence for the federal courts (in which case it had no binding effect on
state courts, but could be superseded by an act of Congress) was only resolved recently in the
case of Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,438 (2000).
6" 46 U.S.C. § 3701.
62 FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 275.
[Vol. 12:335
GUN RIGHTS AND VIOLENT CRIME
initiative in one of these specialized areas by declaring in 1971, just prior to his
reelection campaign, a "war on drugs.' 3 Although the traffic in illegal drugs was
not the kind of crime that Americans most feared, Nixon launched a successful
rhetorical drive to convince the country that many local street crimes, including the
acts of personal violence most feared by Americans, were a result of drug addiction
and the interstate traffic in drugs.6'
Nixon won a landslide reelection in 1972.65 However, because the campaign
largely turned on the administration's conduct of the Vietnam War,' it offered little
opportunity to clarify the stakes in constitutional change dealing with crime.
Shortly after the election, the administration became bogged down in the Watergate
scandal that ultimately resulted in Nixon's resignation from the presidency.67
Ironically, the first president to make the new politics of crime central to his
governance was caught up in the appearance of criminality, compelled to deny in
a public statement that he himself was a "crook."' s Temporarily focused on the
problem of political corruption, the presidencies of Gerald Ford (Nixon's second
vice president, who became president upon Nixon's resignation) and Democrat
Jimmy Carter focused little attention on crime. 9 The crucial post-New Deal role
of the presidency in generating constitutional moments was temporarily disabled in
the crime field.
Ironically, it was the Supreme Court once again whose actions bucked the
national trend toward punitive approaches to crime, and triggered a renewed phase
of higher lawmaking politics around the problem of violent crime. In Furman v.
Georgia"0 the Court struck down all existing death penalty statutes in the United
States, nullifying the death sentences ofhundreds of prisoners on death rows around
the country.71 While no opinion garnered a majority of Justices, it seemed to many
observers that the Court was effectively eliminating the death penalty from
American criminal justice.72
An examination of the opinions shows that the majority viewed the decision as
one of normal constitutional law, and essentially a continuation of the Warren
Court's elaboration of Reconstruction and New Deal themes, while the dissents
contained important hints that a profoundly new conception of the role of
government was taking shape around the threat of violent crime. Justice Douglas,
63 See BECKETr, supra note 41, at 39.
64 See id. at 38.
65 See KENTLETON, supra note 47, at 239.
66 See LEWIS L. GOULD, THE MODERN AMERIcAN PRESIDENCY 149 (2003).
67 See id. at 172.
68 See THE PRESIDENCY A TO Z 277, 348 (2d ed. 1998).
69 See BECKETr, supra note 41, at 44.
70 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
71 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 266 (2003).
72 See id.
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concurring, expressed the view that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishment" included an equal protection value.73 A penalty as rarely
imposed as the modem death penalty opened the door to discriminatory application,
an inference supported by statistical evidence showing disproportionate use against
"the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups."'74 Justice Brennan,
concurring, focused mainly on the declining usage of the death penalty, which he
took as evidence that the American public had effectively rejected the death penalty
even though polls continued to show a closely divided public. 5 In the end, he cited
four different Eighth Amendment values that were offended by the death penalty:
Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong
probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary
society is virtually total; and there is no reason to believe that it serves
any penal purpose more effectively than the less severe punishment of
imprisonment. The function of these principles is to enable a court to
determine whether a punishment comports with human dignity. Death,
quite simply, does not.76
Justice Marshall devoted his concurring opinion to assessing social science
evidence on the utility of the death penalty.77 Because death showed no measurable
superiority to life imprisonment in accomplishing any of the legitimate goals of
criminal punishment (which, in his view, did not include retribution7"), Marshall
concluded that "the death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that
violates the Eighth Amendment."79 Marshall also thought that the majority of
contemporary Americans if they "were fully informed as to the purposes of the
penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and
unacceptable."8
Brennan and Marshall had categorically found that the death penalty violated
the Eighth Amendment, no matter what was done to improve its administration.81
Douglas appeared to lean in that direction, although he left the logical possibility
that a return to more regular use of the death penalty could eliminate its
discriminatory effects.82 Two other Justices, Stewart and White, found the
7 Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 250 (Douglas, J., concurring).
7 See BANNER, supra note 71, at 261.
76 Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77 See BANNER, supra note 71, at 262.
78 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 343 (Marshall, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 358-59.
80 See id. at 361.
81 See BANNER, supra note 71, at 263.
82 Id. at 261.
[Vol. 12:335
GUN RIGHTS AND VIOLENT CRIME
arbitrariness of the current death penalty practice a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, but quite explicitly left the door open to improved statutes and
practice.3
As noted above, President Richard Nixon helped signal the need for a
constitutional change around crime via his harsh criticism of the Warren Court. 4
By the time of Furman he had been able to appoint three new Justices to the
Court.83 Nixon had promised to appoint justices who were willing to change
constitutional direction on crime, and he obtained the results he wanted; all three
of his appointees dissented in Furman. The focus of the dissents was the argument
that the majority was reaching beyond the proper limits of the Eighth Amendment
into decisions that had been properly left to Congress and the state legislatures.
Interestingly, two of the three, Chief Justice Burger and fellow Minnesotan, Justice
Blackmun, expressly indicated their own personal opposition to the death penalty
and suggested that as legislators, they would vote to abolish it.86 The legal postures
of the dissents stressed traditional, prudential, and textual limits to judicial power
rather than new constitutional visions. Dicta in two of the three dissents, however,
pointed in a different direction: toward a new approach to crime, one grounded in
a new appreciation of the victim as the central concern of criminal justice.8 7
Justice Blackmun, although expressing personal opposition to the death penalty,
noted ominously that the majority position might create a populist backlash because
of its apparent empathy with victims of capital punishment, rather than victims of
capital crimes:
It is not without interest, also, to note that, although the several
concurring opinions acknowledge the heinous and atrocious character of
the offenses committed by the petitioners, none of those opinions makes
reference to the misery the petitioners' crimes occasioned to the victims,
to the families of the victims, and to the communities where the offenses
took place. The arguments for the respective petitioners, particularly the
oral arguments, were similarly and curiously devoid of reference to the
victims. There is risk, of course, in a comment such as this, for it opens
one to the charge of emphasizing the retributive....
Nevertheless, these cases are here because offenses to innocent victims
were perpetrated. This fact, and the terror that occasioned it, and the
83 See id.; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring), 310-13 (White,
J., concurring).
94 See KATHERINE BECKEIT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 59 (2000).
85 See BANNER, supra note 71, at 263.
86 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.1, dissenting), 405-06 (White, J., dissenting).
87 See id. at 413-14 (Blackmun, I., dissenting), 444-45 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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fear that stalks the streets of many of our cities today perhaps deserve
not to be entirely overlooked. Let us hope that, with the Court's
decision, the terror imposed will be forgotten by those upon whom it was
visited, and that our society will reap the hoped-for benefits of
magnanimity.
88
Justice Lewis Powell, a Virginian who made no comment on his personal
beliefs but probably supported the death penalty, interjected a similar note,
pointedly calling into question the assumptions about public repugnance against the
death penalty and highlighting the role that murder and violent crime played in
mobilizing the public:
If, as petitioners urge, we are to engage in speculation, it is not at all
certain that the public would experience deep-felt revulsion if the States
were to execute as many sentenced capital offenders this year as they
executed in the mid-1930s. It seems more likely that public reaction,
rather than being characterized by undifferentiated rejection, would
depend upon the facts and circumstances surrounding each particular
case. Members of this Court know, from the petitions and appeals that
come before us regularly, that brutish and revolting murders continue to
occur with disquieting frequency. Indeed, murders arc so commonplace
in our society that only the most sensational receive significant and
sustained publicity. It could hardly be suggested that in any of these
highly publicized murder cases - the several senseless assassinations
or the too numerous shocking multiple murders that have stained this
country's recent history - the public has exhibited any signs of
"revulsion" at the thought of executing the convicted murderers. The
public outcry, as we all know, has been quite to the contrary.
Furthermore, there is little reason to suspect that the public's reaction
would differ significantly in response to other less publicized murders.89
These dissenting comments, although mere dicta, reveal a wholly new vision
of the role of government that was coming into focus around the problem of violent
crime in general, and capital punishment in particular. First and foremost is the
prominence given to the victims of violence. Modem penology with its emphasis
on deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation had little to say about the victim.
Even retribution, as against vengeance, spoke of the importance of social norms
rather than individual feelings. In the years since Furman, crime victims have
emerged not simply as central to criminal justice, but as idealized political subjects
88 Id. at 413-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8I Id. at 444-45 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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whose needs largely define the proper concerns of government." As against the
New Deal consensus shared by many of the Justices themselves, that punishment
should serve collective ends of social control, Blackanun and Powell emphasized the
centrality of the victim, the importance of personal experiences of terror and pain,
and popular satisfaction as an independent and sufficient purpose for capital
punishment.9 Murder as a social problem, more than taxes and welfare, highlighted
the ontological limits of the New Deal with its collectivist notions of risk spreading.
Murder is a risk that cannot be spread in any important sense. By embracing the
death penalty despite its lack of utilitarian effectiveness, Americans were rejecting
the idea of modern penology: that rational ends, rather than emotions, should define
the purposes of government.92 The death penalty would come to symbolize a new
kind of populism in governance, whose reach now extended well beyond criminal
justice.93 It is not clear that either Blackmun or Powell embraced this vision," but
they presciently signaled that the majority opinion in Furman risked mobilizing the
public against it.
M. RATIFICATION AND CONSOLIDATION: FROM GREGG v. GEORGIA TO WILLIE
HORTON
It is clear in retrospect that Furman led to a reaction that would go a long way
toward mobilizing the public and political elites behind just such a consensus. The
response to Furman was fast and furious. Five state legislatures announced their
intention to draft new statutes the day after the opinion was published." In
November 1972, California voters approved an amendment to their state
constitution that restored the death penalty by a margin of two to one.' Historian
Stuart Banner notes:
90 See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 102 (2001); JONATHAN SIMON,
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: THE WAR ON CRIME ANDTHE TRANSFORMATiON OF AMERICA,
1960-2000 (forthcoming 2005) (on file with author).
91 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 413-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 444-45 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
92 See Samuel R. Gross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans' Views on
the Death Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in AMERICA'S BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S
DETH PENALTY 33-34 (Stephen P. Garvey, ed., 2003) (explaining that few Americans cite
deterrence as the reason for supporting the death penalty).
9' See id. at 46.
" In one of his last opinions, Justice Blackmun announced that he would vote to find the
death penalty unconstitutional. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
1s See BANNER, supra note 71, at 268.
96 The California statute had been struck down by the state high court a few months
before Furman. See id.
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[I] fFurman did not influence the direction of change, it almost certainly
influenced the speed of change. Furman suddenly made capital
punishment a more salient issue than it had been in decades, perhaps
ever. People who previously had had little occasion to think about the
death penalty now saw it on the front page of the newspaper. Furman,
like other landmark cases, had the effect of calling its opponents to
action.97
When these new death penalty statutes reached the Supreme Court in 1976,
something very much like the "switch in time" of 1937 came about. Justices
Stewart and White, joined by Republican appointee John Paul Stevens, found that
the new statutes addressed the concerns about arbitrariness and overly-broad
discretion raised by the Stewart and White concurrences to Furman." The new
statutes had not totally repudiated Furman. The statutes approved in Gregg v.
Georgia were drawn from the Model Penal Code and included bifurcated
sentencing procedures, lists of "aggravating factors" or special circumstances that
limited the discretion of prosecutors and juries, and guarantees of appellate review
by the state supreme court." But in the speed with which the statutes were
drafted,'1° and the rising tide of angry rhetoric that accompanied them,' few could
miss this as a mobilization of the nation around the problem of violent crime.
Indeed, after being closely divided for a generation, American public opinion in
favor of the death penalty jumped dramatically to supermajority levels, where it has
remained.'0 2 Over the course of the next few years, the Supreme Court retreated
from even the minimal restraints recognized by Gregg. 3
Moreover, the new death penalty would not be the sluggish institution that
seemed to be slowly dying in the 1960s. The new statutes produced in response to
Furman were put into use with an intensity unseen even during the 1930s.'" More
importantly, the reaction to Furman soon made the death penalty an issue in
virtually every American election, especially for executive offices.'05 If Brennan
and Marshall had been right that the American public, once focused on capital
97 Id. at 268-69.
9' See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
99 Id. at 197-98.
'00 See BANNER, supra note 71, at 268.
101 See Gross & Ellsworth, supra note 92, at 18 (explaining that reaction to Furman was
swift and unequivocal).
02 See BANNER, supra note 71, at 275; FRANKLN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF
AMERicAN CAPrrAL PUNSHMENT 10-11 (2003).
"I See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 305.
104 See BANNER, supra note 71, at 270.
See id. at 276.
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punishment, would reject it,'06 elections would have seen the triumph of abolitionist
candidates" 7 - but the opposite happened.'0
In the immediate aftermath of Gregg, Jimmy Carter, a Democrat with moderate
views on the death penalty won a narrow victory over the Republican incumbent
Gerald Ford (who had succeeded Nixon following the latter's resignation).0 9 That
election remained focused on the Watergate scandal.' 0 In 1980, however, Carter
was decisively defeated by Ronald Reagan, a conservative Republican who made
support for the death penalty, one of his signature issues when he entered politics
in the early 1960s (when opposition to the death penalty was still on the rise).'
While many issues, especially the weak economy and Reagan's call for a hard-line
anti-Communist foreign policy were in play during the election, crime and the death
penalty played a significant role." 2 More importantly, Reagan's full-throated
support for the death penalty went beyond the traditional concerns about deterrence
to embrace the new governmental logic of the death penalty signaled by Justices
Blackmun and Powell in their Furman dissents.
For Reagan, the war on crime was a battle with evil that could only be won by
a government willing to act with total moral certainty and swift retribution. 3 The
death penalty, while only a minor aspect of crime control, was the clearest symbol
of that commitment to certainty and retribution." ' Reagan's administration,
particularly his second Attorney General, Edwin Meese, led a highly visible
campaign to reverse Warren Court precedents like Mapp v. Ohio"' and Miranda v.
Arizona."6 While the Supreme Court refused to completely overrule either, it did
produce numerous opinions reducing the reach and significance of both."7
Perhaps because of the variety of issues in the 1980 campaign, and because
Democrat Jimmy Carter took pains to keep his own views on the death penalty and
crime out of the campaign as much as possible,"' it is difficult to take this election
as an example of a clear ratification election of a constitutional moment around
'06 See id. at 268.
'0' See id. at 276.
log See id.
'0' See id. at 277.
"o See Wj.iAM E. LEUCHTENBERO, IN THE SHADOW OF FDR: FROM HARRY TRUMAN TO
GEORGE W. BUSH 208 (3d ed. 2001).
' See BANNER, supra note 71, at 277.
2 BECKETI" & SASSON, supra note 84, at 60.
" See BECKETr, supra note 41, at 47.
.. See Gross & Ellsworth, supra note 92, at 18.
ts 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
116 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"t See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (limiting exclusionary rule in
cases where police officers act in good faith reliance on a warrant); New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984) (creating public safety exception to Miranda).
"I See GOULD, supra note 66, at 201.
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violent crime. Likewise, Reagan's landslide victory in 1984 followed a campaign
mainly addressing tax policy and other economic issues.' The real ratification
election for the constitutional moment around violent crime took place in 1988
when Reagan's vice president, George H. W. Bush, ran against Democrat Michael
Dukakis in an election thereafter identified with a debate about the death penalty,
and about a convicted criminal named Willie Horton.' 20
Dukakis and the Democrats were expected to do well in 1988.121 The Reagan
administration had been significantly weakened by the post-Watergate politics of
the Iran-Contra scandal."2 Moreover, the economic boom of the Reagan years
seemed to be reaching its limits, and the high costs generated by their policies on
the deficit, on the decline of American manufacturing, and on the decline of
American cities seemed palpable.2 3 Although seventeen points behind Dukakis in
national polls at the time of his nomination, Bush's campaign led to a landslide
victory, largely on the issue of the death penalty. 124 Like Walter Mondale, the
Democratic nominee in 1984, Michael Dukakis was personally opposed to the death
penalty.'25 This time, however, Bush and his advisers found a way to push this to
the center of the campaign. As governor of Massachusetts, Dukakis presided over
a prison furlough program that permitted convicted felons to leave prison
temporarily to prepare for their eventual release. 26
A few years earlier, a felon named Willie Horton used his furlough to launch
a crime spree in which he murdered, raped, and kidnapped a number of victims.'27
Organizations allied with the Bush campaign released television commercials
centering on Willie Horton and accusing Dukakis of failing to identify with the
concerns of ordinary Americans. 2 ' While few saw the commercials, they helped
focus the campaign on crime, and the death penalty in particular. 29 In a widely
remembered debate with Bush, Dukakis was asked how he would respond if his
wife was raped and murdered. 3' Dukakis's response, suggesting that personal
"' See id. at 205.
120 See THE PRESIDENCY A To Z, supra note 68, at 87.
121 See GOULD, supra note 66, at 203.
112 Id. at 204.
123 THE PRESIDENCY A TO Z, supra note 68, at 87.
124 Gross & Ellsworth, supra note 92, at 42.
'25 GOULD, supra note 66, at 205.
"2 Id. Such programs were a common part of penal policy in many states at that time.
127 Michael R. Beschloss, George Bush, 1989-1993, in CHARACTER ABOvE ALL: TEN
PRESIDENTS FROM FDR To GEORGE BUSH 236-37 (Robert A. Wilson, ed., 1995).
128 See SUSAN ESTRICH, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: How PoLIrIcs is DESTROYING
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 65-66 (1998).
129 See id.
130 See Beschloss, supra note 127, at 237.
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feelings should not define state penal policy, became a central point of comparison
with Bush, who emphasized his enthusiasm for the death penalty.
Bush won the election handily in a campaign with few other issues.' In
retrospect it is clear that such programs with their roots in the rehabilitative ideal
represented precisely the kind of collectivist risk-sharing that Americans were
coming to reject through the crime problem. In embracing the death penalty, Bush
was embracing "zero tolerance," in which the government's job was to protect
ordinary Americans against their worst feared losses, no matter the cost to other
purposes or ideals of government."' The death penalty earned its place alongside
the Freedmen's Bureau and the Works Progress Administration as a new emblem
of what the federal government did for people.
While Bush was defeated in 1992 by Democrat William Clinton in a campaign
dominated by economic anxiety, his death penalty politics had become a new
consensus among the political elite. ' Indeed, Clinton, governor of Arkansas at the
time, went out of his way to preside over an execution during the primary campaign
and took every opportunity to signal his shared enthusiasm for the death penalty and
other tough-on-crime measures. 34 As president, Clinton presided over the
restoration of a general federal death penalty and the greatest increase in the
American prison population in history.'35 After being defeated legislatively in his
efforts to expand New Deal-type social programs in 1993 and 1994, Clinton ran for
reelection emphasizing his policies on crime, welfare, and immigration. In 2000,
when Clinton's vice president, Al Gore, faced Bush's son, George W. Bush, the
death penalty was not an issue, as both candidates enthusiastically supported it. 36
The Supreme Court has also signaled its acceptance of the constitutional
transformation around violent crime. The Court has time and again signaled its
willingness to accept popular will on most aspects of capital punishment, including
the death penalty. The Court has affirmed a steady retreat from the implication of
an ongoing constitutional regulation of the death penalty. In the 1986 case of
McCleskey v. Kemp, 3 the Court upheld the Georgia death penalty against a
statistical analysis far more sophisticated than the evidence presented in Furman.
This evidence showed that even the supposedly controlled discretion of post-
Furman statutes resulted in greater odds of a death sentence for killers of white
victims, especially black killers of white victims, even when some 200 variables
31 See Gross & Ellsworth, supra note 92, at 42.
132 Id.
133 See id.
"4 See KENTLEON, supra note 47, at 266.
131 See Gross & Ellsworth, supra note 92, at 44.
136 As governor ofTexas, Bush had presided over more than 100 executions. Although the
public was actually uneasy over the scale of the Texas death penalty and charges that
innocent people might be executed, Gore declined to criticize Bush in any way on the issue.
"' 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
2004]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
were controlled. ' In the view of the Court, even if the measurable racial disparity
could not be explained away, it did not condemn capital punishment in the absence
of proof of discriminatory intent by someone in a specific case.'39 McCleskey was
not inconsistent with past equal-protection decisions that required intent, 0 but it
clearly signaled that the death penalty was for the most part, a normal penal practice
without a particular taint of racism, as several members of the Furman Court had
clearly held.
McCleskey raised bitter dissent from the remaining members of the Furman
majority who were still on the Court in the mid-1980s. 4' By the mid-1990s, after
tough-on-crime Democrat Bill Clinton 42 had appointed two individuals to the
Supreme Court, basic challenges to the death penalty and other features of a whole
generation of state and federal penal statutes constructed in the spirit of populist
punitiveness received little serious dissent. 43 In the 2003 term, a solid majority of
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of California's three-strikes law
under an Eighth Amendment proportionality review in a variety of cases involving
nonviolent offenses where defendants received sentences of life imprisonment with
no real hope for parole.'" The opinion all but abandoned the idea that the Eighth
Amendment set some limits to the quantity of punishment applicable to even
undeniably modem penal techniques like imprisonment, which had been cultivated
since the 1920s.
V. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT AROUND VIOLENT CRIME AND
THE RIGHT TO ARMS
If the U.S. Constitution truly has been reshaped by a constitutional moment
around violent crime (and by effect, nonviolent crime as well), it is appropriate to
consider the right to arms as it may have been (or is being) recast by this moment.
It is, however, far from clear that the constitutional change around crime has
produced a determinate result for the question of whether the right to arms should
be seen today primarily as individual or linked to the institutional life of the militias
or some successor institutions. The question may still be taking shape in the still-
fluid constitutional landscape remade by violent crime since the 1960s. Indeed,
13 See id. at 312-13.
139 Id.
"4 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that an equal-protection
violation requires racially discriminatory purpose).
141 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 320.
142 EsTRIcH, supra note 128, at 69.
143 Representative was the unanimous opinion upholding a one-strike-and-you're-out
policy against residents of federal housing projects. See Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v.
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
'44 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
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both the contemporary gun-rights movement, and the contemporary gun-control
movement can rightly argue that they represent the legitimate extension of the way
"We the People" demanded that the government protect individuals against
interpersonal violence in the period since the 1960s. 45
The gun-control movement can rightly point out that since gun violence is the
primary source of lethality in violent crime, "We the People" must be assumed to
have assented to the federal government's (and certainly the states') actions to
control access to guns, when such actions have a rational relationship to diminishing
crime. In support of this genealogy, they can point out that the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968" included the first modem federal gun-
control law.'47 Gun-control proponents can also point to the opposition of
contemporary police departments to a broad individual right to arms. More than
any other organ of government, the police have merged their identity with crime
victims themselves so that they are simultaneously seen as the victim advocates
with the least conflict of interest, and as victims themselves of criminal violence
and the failures of other government institutions. 4 Starting with the 1968 crime
bill, 49 the federal and state governments have invested substantially in linking
themselves with the police. Few candidates for executive office at any level can
succeed against the opposition of the police.
Proponents of the individual gun-rights view seem to have an even stronger
hand. They can argue that gun ownership offers the most direct way for citizens to
assure their own defense against lethal violence by others,' and that "We the
People," aroused by government's failure to respond adequately to violent crime,
would reasonably have chosen to protect this valuable right against further errors
by an unresponsive state that limits access to guns.' This argument is supported
,' See Jonathan Simon, Gun, Gates and Governance, 39 HoUs. L. REv. 133 (2002).
'4 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
147 Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 201-406, 82 Stat. 197, 902. Ironically it was added after the
passage of the primary legislative package in response to the assassination of Senator Robert
Kennedy, one of the leading critics of the overall legislation's approach to crime. The
primary bill was actually voted on the day following the assassination.
148 Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 BROoK. L. REv. 1035,
1061 (2002).
"' Pub. L. No. 90-351 § 701(a), 82 Stat. 210 (1968), and Pub. L. No. 90-578 § 301(a)(3),
82 Stat. 1115 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2003)).
'-0 Some, including myself, might be inclined to question this empirically, but that does
not mean that the research record is clear enough to resolve the question as a matter of
constitutional law.
"' Thus, the requirement of background checks to confirm the eligibility of a person to
purchase a gun (felonies being the primary restriction on eligibility today) although
substantively rational, might come to seem deeply misguided to a citizen who decides on the
eve of a riot or a natural disaster likely to result in crime (like a massive hurricane) to
purchase a firearm for the defense of her family and finds it impossible to qualify in time.
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by the whole tenor of crime lawmaking at both the state and federal levels since the
1968 crime bill, and especially the wave of lawmaking that has followed the states'
repudiation of Furman v. Georgia. This body of law shares a number of themes
that speak to an individual right to arms:
" It is profoundly mistrustful of government action, especially by
New-Deal-type collectivist social agencies.
" It believes in a zero-sum game of security between victims and
criminals.
* It celebrates crime victims as possessors of the truth more
important than scientific studies or political hierarchies.
" It recognizes lethal violence as a legitimate response to lethal
violence.
All of these seem to favor the view that the crime-control revolution that has
unfolded since 1972 transformed what Uviller and Merkel argue was a dead letter
into a living personal right to arms. The Supreme Court has yet to offer a
contemporary reading of the Second Amendment. It is likely to speak soon. One
result of Uviller and Merkel's persuasive arguments about the Federalist and
Reconstruction amendments is to make it more likelythat any Supreme Court ruling
in favor of individual gun rights will further mark a constitutional break with the
past over the issue of violent crime.
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